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JUSTICE HARLAN'S LEGAL PROCESS*
MARTHA A. FIELD**

Justice John M. Harlan's virtues as a proceduralist are so familiar as
to be obvious. All of the papers presented at this splendid centennial
conference attest to Justice Harlan's qualities of reasoned elaboration and
procedural honesty-qualities that seem to set him apart from other judges
and Justices. Accordingly, he served as a model of procedural regularity

on the Warren Court, acting as the Court's "conservative conscience."'

He also stressed that judicial restraint, stare decisis, and reasoned
elaboration are central to decision making. Harlan was unusual because he

genuinely seemed to care more about how a case was decided than about
the result reached. Even today-twenty years after his retirement-he
serves as the model for these judicial virtues.
Another of Harlan's important contributions was advancing our

thinking about federalism and the separation of powers. One focus of
Harlan's opinions was explaining and defending the values behind those

doctrines, and his opinions helped build a literature concerning the
demands and contributions of the federal system that is still much used by

the Court today.2 Harlan believed it absolutely necessary to give wide
leeway both to the states and to the other branches of the federal

government to work out their own solutions to the nation's problems. 3

* Presented at the New York Law School Centennial Conference in Honor of Justice
John Marshall Harlan (Apr. 20, 1991).
** Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. Norman Dorsen, The Second Mr. Justice Harlan: A Constitutional Conservative,
44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 249, 250 (1969).
2. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Justice John M. Harlanand the Values ofFederalism,
57 VA. L. REV. 1185, 1186 (1971).
3. For example, Harlan argued frequently against Supreme Court formulation of
constitutionally required rules of criminal procedure; he believed that "regard for our
system of federalism" required that the choice of proper rules "be left to the States" unless
the state policies were arbitrary or denied a defendant fundamental fairness. Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 39 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Spencer v. Texas, 385
U.S. 554, 568-69 (1967) ("It would be a wholly unjustifiable encroachment by this Court
upon the constitutional power of States to promulgate their own rules of evidence to try
their own state-created crimes in their own state courts, so long as their rules are not
prohibited by any provision of the United States Constitution .

. .

.").

Of course, a

standard like fundamental fairness on its face could be associated with strong judicial
power, because it is so subjective and indefinite, but Harlan clearly contemplated that this
judicial power be exercised with the utmost restraint, invalidating state legislation in only
the most extreme of cases.
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The federal nature of the government left "ample room for

governmental and social experimentation" 4 in solving national problems,

with the states serving as "experimental social laboratories."" For the
Supreme Court to dictate national requirements would be to "destroy that
opportunity for broad experimentation which is the genius of our federal
system."' If the states were allowed to try various procedures, the best
solution to a given problem could eventually emerge, and the states would
be free to adopt it instead of being limited to one imposed by the Supreme
Court.7 Harlan did concede that "'[t]here are limits to the extent to which

a legislatively represented majority may conduct... experiments at the
expense of the dignity and personality' of the individual," but he usually
was willing to give the states great leeway in trying different methods to
promote their various social policies.

Another rationale Harlan repeatedly put forth in support of federalism,
was that the states were more in touch with the practical affairs of the
'real world,' while the Supreme Court had an ivory tower perspective, too
far removed from the effects of its own pronouncements.9 Thus, when the
One illustration of Harlan's respect for states' rights is his endorsement of a double
standard of review for federal and state law enforcement practices, even in areas concerning
the Bill of Rights. When, for example, cases came before the Court involving obscenity
convictions, Harlan favored upholding state convictions but reversing federal ones,
maintaining that two separate standards of review applied. See Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 496 (1957) (Harlan, I., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Harlan
concurred in upholding the conviction of Alberts in Alberts v. California, a companion case
decided with Roth, because the state's determination that obscene material be suppressed
was consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 502. He would have reversed,
however, the conviction of Roth under the federal obscenity statute because the federal
government, as opposed to the state governments, has only an incidental interest in
regulating sexual morality. See id. at 504.
4. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 133 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
5. Roth, 354 U.S. at 505.
6. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 48 (1967) (Harlan, J.,dissenting).
7. Sometimes different standards would be appropriate for different states or local
communities. Even when a "best" solution did emerge, ,states were not always required to
adopt it; the question remained whether their own procedures were constitutionally
adequate. See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 567-68 (1967) ("To say that the
two-stage jury trial in the English-Connecticut style is probably the fairest ...isa far cry
from a constitutional determination that this method of handling the problem is compelled
by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
8. Poev. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 555 (1961) (Harlan, J.,dissenting) (quoting Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 546 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
9. See Stephen M. Dane, "Ordered Liberty" and Self-Restraint: The Judicial
Philosophy of the Second Justice Harlan, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 545, 550-51 (1982);
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Court ruled that states were required to provide jury trials, Harlan
dissented, saying that the states were better able to determine if providing
a jury was feasible."0 In Harlan's mind, deference to the states' practical
experience was almost always warranted because of the "Court's
remoteness from particular state problems.""
Similar to Harlan's ideas about federalism were his concerns with the
separation of powers. As a Justice, he was particularly concerned with
restricting the Court to its proper role within the system. He deplored the
Warren Court's activist course and argued that "this Court, ordained as
a judicial body, [should not] be thought of as a general haven for reform
movements."" In failing to defer to the other branches of government,
the Court was usurping the legislative role and making decisions based on
"its own notions of public policy and judgment" " at the expense of
established constitutional principles. He believed that the Court, "limited
in function in accordance with [the premise of diffusion of governmental
authority], does not serve its high purpose when it exceeds its authority,
even to satisfy justified impatience with the slow workings of the political
process."14 Judicial restraint on the part of the Court was the only
correct approach.
Federalism and separation of powers, to Harlan, were often the
theoretical underpinning for important procedural rules, but they also were
constitutional requirements in their own right-bedrock requirements of
our form of government. Harlan did not consider the doctrines antithetical
to civil liberties; instead he reasoned that individual rights were better
protected in the long run by this governmental structure than by an activist
Court. As he put it,
[c]onstitutionally principled adjudication, high in the process of
which is due recognition of the just demands of federalism, leaves
ample room for the protection of individual rights. A
constitutional democracy which in order to cope with seeming
needs of the moment is willing to temporize with its basic
Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 1194-95.
10. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 192-93 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("Exactly why the States should not be allowed to make continuing adjustments, based on
the state of their criminal dockets and the difficulty of summoning jurors, simply escapes
me.").
11. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 682 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
12. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 625 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
13. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 312 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
14. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 624-25.
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distribution and limitation of governmental powers will sooner or
later find itself in trouble."
For many, however, such procedural requirements did not seem

value-neutral, and certainly not supportive of individual liberties. During
the same period when Harlan was serving on the Court, Australia's

Labour Party leader (soon to be Prime Minister) was calling concern for
states' rights "constitutional constipation," and claiming "[tihe whole

phoney war over States' rights serves to protect private affluence and to
promote public squalor." 16 Was Harlan concerned with states' rights just
because that position coincided with his views on social issues? This has
been a favorite theme of commentators-whether Justice Harlan was
process-oriented for its own sake or whether he espoused that approach
because the results coincided with his own conservative political views.17

Of course it is difficult to separate procedure from substance-or, in
this instance, to separate a judge's views on procedural matters from his
or her views of substantive justice. Surely Justice Harlan's fidelity to
procedural regularity and the respect he accorded states fit with some of

his substantive views-his essential satisfaction with the status quo and his
disinclination for extending continuing protections to those convicted of
crimes. If he had felt very strongly about the existence of social injustices,
he' might not have been willing so often to put procedural concerns
first.18 Similarly, Harlan's fondness for history and tradition reflects a
15. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 99 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also
Dane, supra note 9, at 548-49 (discussing Harlan's belief that "the very structure of
government itself" protects individual liberty).
16. Gough Whitlam, A New Federalism, 43 AUSTL. Q. 6, 7 (1971). Gough Whitlam
became leader of the Australian Labour Party in 1967 and was a staunch defender of
British-style constitutional conventions. He was elected Prime Minister of Australia in 1972
and was controversially dismissed in 1975 by the Governor of Australia. For further
criticism of the principles of federalism, see ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSITrUTION 171, 173,. 175 (9th ed. 1939) ("Federal
government means weak government ....
Federalism tends to produce conservatism.
•.Federalism substitutes litigation for legislation.").
17. See, e.g., Dorsen, supra note 1, at 257; Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 1191-92.
18. Justice Harlan seemed more willing to abandon his staunch adherence to
procedural regularity when the cases dealt with privacy and marital relations (areas more
of concern to the upper and middle classes) than when they dealt with crime or protections
for the poor. Compare Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(asserting that a statute criminalizing use of contraception by married couples is "an
intolerable and unjustifiable invasion of privacy" that violates the Fourteenth Amendment)
with Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 29 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that states
are not constitutionally required to furnish transcripts to indigent defendants in felony cases)
and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655-56 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating
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Justice raised in privileged circumstances. As Norman Dorsen has noted,
Justice Harlan had little "direct exposure to the special problems of the
less privileged sector of the community." 19
There are, however, cases in which Harlan followed procedural rules
that led to results he would not favor on the merits. Indeed, that is the
central claim of procedural honesty. This is not to say that he did not care
about substantive results, but if such cases are typical, he cared more
about procedural honesty.'
And in choosing which procedures to follow, Harlan, like other
judges, was inevitably influenced by his own substantive judgments,
including on occasion reasons he would not articulate in the course of his
reasoned elaboration. Habeas corpus is an area in which Justice Harlan
always took a strong stand which he justified on grand theories of
federal-state jurisprudence. Those of us who were there during the last
moments of the Warren Court know that Harlan looked forward to the
overruling of Fay v. Noia21 as a neat and easy way to neutralize en masse
the Warren Court rulings on criminal procedure. It would be fully
effective, and it would avoid the stare decisis problems that repeated
overrulings of individual criminal procedure decisions would pose.
Harlan might, I suppose, have confessed to that purpose, had he had
the opportunity to write such an opinion. He did confess in two opinions
that he had gone along with the Court's adoption of nonretroactivity rules
even though he thought they were wrong in principle; he said he had gone
along because the effect was to limit the applicability of criminal
that a residence requirement for receiving welfare benefits is not unconstitutional). Justice
Harlan's opinion in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), which dealt with the
constitutionality of denying divorces to those who could not pay court fees and costs,
implicates both of these areas. Harlan's opinion for the Court relies on due process to hold
that states cannot constitutionally deny divorces in these cases. See id. at 374-83.
19. Dorsen, supra note 1, at 252; see also Henry 1. Bourguignon, The Second Mr.
Justice Harlan: His Principles of Judicial Decision Making, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 251,
326-27 (discussing factors in Harlan's privileged upbringing that may have influenced his
judicial philosophy). Even so, Harlan supported civil rights and civil liberties concerns
(although not the rights of criminals) more often than his reputation as a conservative would
indicate. See Dorsen, supra note 1, at 268.
20. Harlan may have differed less with the majority concerning what reforms should
be achieved than he did concerning whether it was the Court's role to achieve them. See
Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 1190-91. However, he did seem willing to sacrifice reform in
the interests of federalism, or more broadly, constitutionalism, by maintaining that his role
as a Justice was not to cure the ills
of society. This stance, apparently a neutral principle,
in fact favors the status quo.
21. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). In Fay, the Court expanded the scope of federal habeas
corpus by holding that federal courts could grant relief even on claims the defendant had
not previously raised or pursued. See id. at 398-99.
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procedure decisions with which he disagreed. ' But whether or not he
always expressed his reasoning or always put procedural values above
substantive ones, certainly within the spectrum of judges, Harlan was
extremely process-oriented and, as the commentators have all concluded,
possessed an unusual degree of judicial integrity.'
There are many ways to illustrate these points about Justice Harlan.
I will do so primarily by discussing one case-Desist v. United States.'
Indeed, that is the case cited above in which Justice Harlan announced the
ways in which he wanted to alter the Court's approach to retroactivity.
Desist is also a good vehicle for comparing Justice Harlan's approach with
that of the Supreme Courts that followed him.
Desist was decided in 1969 with Justice Harlan writing in dissent.'
Desist illustrates several different facets of Justice Harlan's attention to
procedure, including his approach of reasoned elaboration, which, I
believe, attests to his concern for the decision-making process. Harlan's
usual style was to explain his own reasons, paying attention to points on
the other side, making those points well and attempting to meet them.
During the process of thinking through the arguments, Harlan sometimes
decided that his original inclination was wrong, or even that an opinion he
had earlier published was wrong. If so, he would admit his change of
heart and explain his prior error.' As a law clerk,' one of the things
I most admired about Justice Harlan was his ability to change his mind,
which I associated with a willingness to keep thinking. Some other
Justices, by contrast, were more concerned with the consistency of their
own jurisprudence and less ready to continue thinking about issues where
they had already taken a position.
Desist was one of the cases during the 1968 Term in which Justice
Harlan changed his position. The issue in Desist was whether the rule of
22. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 676 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("I . . . initially grasped [nonretroactivity] as a way of
limiting the reach of decisions that seemed... fundamentally unsound."); Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("I have in the past joined in
some of [the Court's opinions on nonretroactivity] .... because I thought it important to
'limit the impact of constitutional decisions which seemed to me profoundly unsound in
principle.").
23. See, e.g., Bourguignon, supra note 19, at 327; Dorsen, supra note 1, at 270;
Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 1192.
24. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
25. See id. at 256 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
26. See, e.g., id. at 258-59.
27. Unlike most of the participants in this conference, I did not clerk for Justice
Harlan. I knew him only at a distance, when I clerked for another Justice during the 1968
Term.
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Katz v. United States,2 that electronic surveillance was a search within
the protection of the Fourth Amendment, should apply retroactively. The
Court held it should apply only_ to cases in which wiretaps took place
subsequent to the Katz opinion. It would not apply to other cases, even
if they had not yet been tried or were on direct appeal when the rule was
adopted.
Justice Harlan dissented, saying all so-called "new" constitutional
rules must at a minimum apply to all cases still on direct review when the
decision is handed down, because it is unprincipled and unjudicial to
distinguish between criminal defendants still on direct review.' In
Harlan's words,
[s]imply fishing one case from the stream of appellate review,
using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new constitutional standards,
and then permitting a stream of similar cases subsequently to flow
by unaffected by that new rule constitute an indefensible departure
from [our] model of judicial review.
. . .We apply and definitively interpret the Constitution,
under [the Court's] view of our role, not because we are bound
to, but only because we occasionally deem it appropriate, useful,
or wise. That sort of choice may permissibly be made by a
legislature or a council of revision, but not by a court of law. 3'
But, according to Harlan, very different considerations apply to retroactive
application of "new constitutional principles" on habeas corpus. Applying
new rules in this context would seriously upset finality and furthermore is
28.
29.
30.
31.

389 U.S. 347 (1967).
See Desist, 394 U.S. at 254.
See id. at 258.
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part). Similarly, he had explained in Desist:

In the classical view of constitutional adjudication, which I share, criminal
defendants cannot come before this Court simply to request largesse. This Court
is entitled to decide constitutional issues only when the facts of a particular case

require their resolution for a just adjudication on the merits. We do not release
a criminal from jail because we like to do so, or because we think it wise to do
so, but only because the government has offended constitutional principle in the

conduct of his case. And when another similarly situated defendant comes before
us, we must grant the same relief or give a principled reason for acting
differently. We depart from this basic judicial tradition when we simply pick and
choose from among similarly situated defendants those who alone will receive
the benefit of a "new" rule of constitutional law.
Desist, 394 U.S. at 258-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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not required to deter unconstitutional conduct.32 Accordingly, Harlan
concluded that new decisions generally should not apply on habeas. 33
Desist thus illustrates Harlan's attention to procedural principle-his
objection to distinguishing between criminal defendants on direct appeal,
even though the effect of that objection was to free the defendant and to
extend the application of constitutional holdings with which Harlan often
disagreed.' Desist also shows Harlan's concern for separation of
powers, in his objections to judges deciding in a prospective, legislative
manner,.

Justice Harlan was not always a dissenter. Some of the cutbacks in
federal jurisdiction that he suggested and promoted were put into effect
while he sat on the Court. Most notably, Harlan was able in 1971 to join
the Court's opinion in Younger v. Harris,3' making into law the position
he had urged as a dissenter in Dombrowski v. Pfister,' six years earlier.
This victory for Harlan made it much more difficult for federal courts to
pass upon the constitutionality of state criminal laws-a position that
Justice Harlan maintained was required by principles of federalism.37
On retroactivity and habeas corpus, in contrast, Harlan remained a
dissenter through his lifetime. Two years ago, however, in Teague v.
Lane,3" the Supreme Court picked up Justice Harlan's Desist approach
and wrote it into law with what it claimed were only minor modifications.
The Court at least purported ,to use Harlan's scheme, which had been
rejected during his lifetime, to modify habeas after his death. 3' This in
itself attests to Harlan's abiding influence. It is most unusual for a Justice
to have his opinions written into law in this fashion after he has retired.
Teague, a 1989 case, held that new constitutional rules should not
normally apply on habeas corpus. 4' The other part of Harlan's approach,
requiring that all court decisions be fully applicable to all cases on direct
appeal, had already been adopted by the Supreme Court. 4' Teague's
32. See Mackey, 401 U.S. at 690-91 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Desist, 394 U.S. at 262-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
33. Harlan did make two exceptions for when new rules should apply on habeas. See
infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
34. Harlan had, however, concurred in the Court's opinion in Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967), which was at issue in Desist.
35. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
36. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
37. See id. at 498 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
38. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
39. See id. at 306 (citing Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
40. See id. at 310.
41. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321-25 (1987); United States v. Johnson,
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holding was necessarily important to habeas corpus and its scope, but how
important it would be would depend on how certain subissues were
resolved-in particular, what would be considered a "new rule" and also
what scope the Teague exceptions would be given. When we look at these
factors we find ourselves asking whether the Court did pick up Harlan's
position after all. Instead, it seems the Court has used Justice Harlan's
language to justify its position, which is in fact significantly more farreaching and difficult to defend than Harlan's, and which also is almost
fatal to habeas corpus-all but eradicating the writ for state prisoners
challenging their convictions. Harlan never had proposed going so far.
There are several ways in which the current Court has altered
Harlan's approach. Justice Harlan believed that all rules, no matter how
new, were to be applied retroactively on direct appeal but that "new
constitutional rules" (a phrase he put in quotation marks) should not be
applied on habeas unless the rule was "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty," as Justice Harlan saw it.42 But even then, he was limiting his
nonretroactivity concept to a fairly exceptional situation-one involving
a "new constitutional rule." He stressed that the usual situation is for a
rule to develop out of past precedent and not be the kind of clear break
with the past that is sometimes prospective only.' Indeed, in Desist,
Harlan criticized the majority for reading "new rule" too broadly; he
implied that if a ruling is clearly foreshadowed by precedent it should not
be considered the kind of clear break with the past that can be
nonretroactive." The kind of rule Harlan had in mind for nonretroactive
application was the per se rule that did not grow out of the usual process
of common law development-the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,
Miranda, per se rules requiring the presence of an attorney at lineups, and
so forth. Harlan described new rules as rules where "one can say with
assurance that there was a time at which this Court would have ruled
differently,"' using the term to refer to cases that overruled earlier
Supreme Court decisions.'
457 U.S. 537, 545-550 (1982).
42. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
43. See Desist, 394 U.S. at 263 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[M]any. .. of this Court's
constitutional decisions are grounded upon fundamental principles whose content does not
change dramatically from year to year, but whose meanings are altered slowly and subtly
as generation succeeds generation.").
44. See id. at 264-65.
45. Id. at 264.
46. In one case that did overturn a Supreme Court decision that Harlan believed was
wrong, Harlan thought it was a close question whether that was the kind of new rule that
should not apply on habeas, although he did go along with nonretroactivity. See Mackey,
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The current Court, in contrast, wants to make all developments in the
law prospective only for purposes of habeas corpus; nonretroactivity

becomes the norm, instead of an exceptional situation. Justice Scalia has
argued that the concept of a "new rule" has to include not only one that
overturns a previous rule but also one that fills a vacuum, one that
replaces palpable uncertainty as to what the law is. Otherwise, he says,
Teague would add little to preexisting nonretroactivity law.47 Scalia may

be correct that it would add little, but Justice Harlan's concern was not in
trying to add to nonretroactivity law. Justice Harlan's quarrel with the
Warren Court really concerned only what was the appropriate date for
nonretroactivity; he had no quarrel about which rules were retroactive, and

was not attempting to increase the number of rules that were prospective
only." His primary quarrel was with the notion of prospectivity at all for
judicial decisions, pointing out that such decisions were essentially

legislative in nature and encouraged the Court to continue to act in this
inappropriate fashion.49 This is not the approach used by the current

Court, which seems bent upon broadening the concept of the
nonretroactive new rule.

Two Terms ago, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in Sawyer

v. Smith5' and declining to apply a rule he deemed a "new" one, said the

purpose of Teague was "to ensure that gradual developments in the law
over which reasonable jurists may disagree are not later used to upset the

finality of state convictions valid when entered."" The Court has moved
a long way from the "clear break with the past" that used to identify a
new rule for possible prospective treatment.
One indication from Teague itself that it would be broadly applied and

that nonretroactivity was to become the norm came when Justice
401 U.S. at 700-01 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
47. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 353 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
48. See Desist, 394 U.S. at 257-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Court had held that
whether a new rule should be nonretroactive depended upon the purpose of the rule, the
reliance of police and other law enforcement officials on the old standard, and the effect
on the administration of justice that retroactive application would have. See Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). The prototype rule for nonretroactive application under
this test was a new rule whose purpose was to deter illegal police behavior, such as most
rules concerning illegal searches and arrests.
49. This was a favorite theme of Harlan's, as it involved the separation of powers, a
cornerstone of his judicial philosophy. See, e.g., Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,
677 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("What emerges from
today's decisions is that... the Court is free to act, in effect, like a legislature .... [and]
I completely disagree with this point of view.").
50. 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
51. Id. at 2827.
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O'Connor, writing for the Court, turned nonretroactivity into a threshold
question.52 The petitioner in Teague argued that he, a black man, was
unconstitutionally tried by a jury from which all blacks had been excluded.
Justice O'Connor declined to decide whether such an exclusion would
violate the Constitution, claiming that any ruling of unconstitutionality
would be a nonretroactive "new rule."53 Criticizing O'Connor's
conclusion that she did not even have to formulate the rule in order to
know that it would not be retroactive, Justice Stevens pointed out that you
cannot know whether a rule is a new one or not until you know what the
rule is.' The majority's approach, however, was to decline to decide
what the rule would require on the ground that any rule under which he
would prevail would necessarily be "new." 55 That approach, as well as
preventing persons like Teague from gaining release on habeas, had the
important consequence of preventing habeas corpus from serving as the
occasion for the announcement of any new rules of constitutional law.
When coupled with the broad definition of "new rule" that the Court
adopted, the approach sharply constricts federal courts' habeas jurisdiction
and also effectively prevents federal district courts from developing
constitutional principles in state criminal cases.
Nothing in Harlan's writings would support nonretroactivity as a
threshold question, but he did use language that could lend support to
other facets of the current Court's approach. In particular, he said as a
dissenter that habeas claims should be decided in accordance with the law
in existence at the time of conviction and not the law prevailing at the time
of the habeas proceeding.' But Harlan would certainly not have
interpreted the standard the way the Court does today. Teague said the
rules to apply on habeas are those "dictated by precedent existing at the
time the defendant's conviction became final," with Justice O'Connor,
writing for the Court, emphasizing "dictated."'
Two Terms ago the
52. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 300.
53. Id. at 315. Fourteen years earlier the Supreme Court had held that the Sixth
Amendment required that the jury venire be drawn from a fair cross section of the
community, but it did not require that petit juries actually chosen must reflect the whole
community. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). The prosecutor in Teague had
used all of his ten preemptory challenges to exclude blacks, with the result that it was an
all-white jury that tried and convicted Teague. The petitioner in Teague argued that the
rationale of the earlier case prohibited deliberate exclusion of blacks from the petit jury.
The Court said: "Because we hold that the rule urged by petitioner should not be applied
retroactively to cases on collateral review, we decline to address petitioner's contention."
Teague, 489 U.S. at 299.
54. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 319 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
55. Id. at 315-16.
56. See Desist, 394 U.S. at 263 (Harlan, J.,dissenting).
57. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. Justice Brennan in his dissent pointed out that few

NEW YORK L4W SCHOOL L4W REVIEW

[Vol. 36

Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, reiterated this as the test
to determine which rules are not new and emphasized that a decision was
"new" enough not to apply on habeas even though it represented only an
extension of the reasoning of previous cases.58 This makes the proper
course for a judge deciding a habeas petition to go back to the law that
existed when the petitioner was convicted and to apply the law as
restrictively and narrowly as she possibly can, not the way she would
normally apply it.59 And Rehnquist went further, stating that "[tihe 'new
rule' principle . . . validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of
existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to
be contrary to later decisions."' ° If the rightness of a rule that was
adopted would have been "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds,"
its adoption constitutes a "new rule" within the meaning of Teague.61
The result is that habeas is left only to redress bad faith applications of
law by state court judges, and then, only when the bad faith is obvious.
It is no longer available to review whether state judges decided federal
claims correctly. The inquiry now is whether they decided them
reasonably.
Under the Court's approach, since all developments are new rules, the
only developments that will be applied on habeas are those that fall within
the Court's exceptions. Justice Harlan and the current Court agree on one
exception: if the substance of the offense for which a prisoner was
convicted is held unconstitutional, that holding must apply fully on
habeas.62 Persons convicted of obtaining abortions or burning flags must
decisions on appeal or collateral review are dictated by what came before; most involve
questions of law that are at least debatable. See id. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. See Butler v. McKellar, 110 S.Ct. 1212 (1990). Rehnquist stated that
the fact that a court says that its decision is within the "logical compass" of an
earlier decision, or indeed that it is "controlled" by a prior decision, is not
conclusive for purposes of deciding whether the current decision is a "new rule"
under Teague. Courts frequently view their decisions as being "controlled" or
"governed" by prior opinions even when aware of reasonable contrary
conclusions reached'by other courts.
Id. at 1217.
59. As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent in Butler, "[a] federal court may no
longer consider the merits of the petitioner's claim based on its best interpretation and
application of the law prevailing at the time her conviction became final; rather, it must
defer to the state court's decision rejecting the claim unless that decision is patently
unreasonable." Id. at 1221 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
60. Id. at 1217.
61. Id. at 1214.
62. Harlan made an explicit exception for new substantive rules that place "certain
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe." Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
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therefore be freed when their offenses are ruled unconstitutional. But
starting in Teague, O'Connor disagreed with Harlan's second exception
to nonretroactivity on habeas. When a prisoner objects to procedures that
were used to convict him and that have subsequently been held
unconstitutional, Justice O'Connor would apply the current constitutional
interpretation only for those new procedures without which the likelihood
of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.'° Justice Harlan, by
contrast, would apply on habeas the broader standard of all "procedures
. . . implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' Harlan originally had
suggested a formulation more like that of the current Court,' but he
rejected it partly because he found "inherently intractable the purported
distinction between those new rules that are designed to improve the
factfinding process and those designed principally to further other
values. "'

In other respects as well, the current Court has attempted to limit
habeas corpus to prisoners who can make a colorable claim of factual
innocence and has lessened its availability as a device to keep courts and

prosecutors faithful to constitutional law. Of course, the prototype rule for
full retroactivity had always been one that affected the reliability of the

fact-finding process; the new development is that this is now the only basis
for retroactive application of rules of criminal procedure. And even the

exception for rules that go to guilt or innocence is very strictly applied,
not extending to petitioners like Teague himself, a black man objecting to

systematic exclusion of blacks from the jury that tried him.67

concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor incorporated this exception into
her test in Teague. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 312.
63. See id. at 299-301.
64. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, I., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
65. See Desist, 394 U.S. at 262 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[A]II 'new' constitutional
rules which significantly improve the pre-existing fact-finding procedures are to be
retroactively applied on habeas.").
66. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 695 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In his concurring opinion in Teague, Justice Stevens indicated that he favored Harlan's later
formulation over the standard adopted by Justice O'Connor. See Teague, 489 U.S. at
320-21 (Stevens, I., concurring).
67. Another harsh aspect of the Teague result is that Teague had raised his objection
at all stages of the trial and appellate process. On direct appeal the courts had either refused
to hear it or decided it erroneously. The case therefore does not involve any issue of waiver
by the petitioner, which has been the troublesome issue in many habeas cases. See, e.g.,
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). Even before Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963),
a case like Teague, where the defendant had pursued his claim in the state courts, led to
release on habeas. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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There are other ways as well in which the present Court's approach
differs from Harlan's, but enough has been said to illustrate that the Court
has gone well beyond any plans Harlan announced for cutting back habeas
corpus.' It is somewhat interesting to speculate whether Justice Harlan
might not have joined such decisions, given the opportunity, or whether
he would have resisted them. In fact, this question is fun to muse about
with respect to many opinions of the more conservative Court that
followed Justice Harlan.
Partly because Justice Harlan's positions were more moderate, we
think of them'as positions of principle. In contrast, after his retirement the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts often blatantly manipulated procedural rules
to achieve substantive results. They purported to follow in Justice Harlan's
conservative tradition, justifying their proceduralism as embodying judicial
values and often invoking Harlan's language in their support, but the
Court's application of doctrines like federalism and separation of powers
is often obviously result-oriented. 69
Many cases could serve to illustrate this point. I will briefly discuss
three examples: Duke Power v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc. ,' Michigan v. Long,7 and Arizona v. Fulminante.7
Duke Power was decided in 1978, seven years after Harlan's
retirement. It involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a provision
of the federal Price-Anderson Act limiting liability for nuclear accidents
resulting from the operation of nuclear power plants. When the case came
to the Supreme Court, the district court had decided it on the merits,
holding the limitation of liability unconstitutional. 3 There were at least
two reasons why the case did not appear justiciable. First, under existing
Supreme Court precedents,74 the controversy did not seem to be ripe and
the plaintiffs did not appear to have standing. No nuclear accident had
68. The Court's restrictions on habeas corpus go beyond problems of retroactivity. For
example, last Term in MeCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991), the Court adopted a
."cause and prejudice" standard for repeat habeas corpus petitions, making it more difficult
for a petitioner to raise issues omitted from the first habeas petition than it had been under
the previous standard, articulated in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
69. Similarly, the Supreme Court's recent treatment of stare decisis has been
remarkable, and out of keeping with Harlan's philosophy. Compare Payne v. Tennessee,
111 S. Ct. 2597, 2611 (1991) with Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 122-29 (1970)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
70. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
71. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
72. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
73. See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 68.
74. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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occurred and no property had been lost. Why then should neighbors be
permitted to challenge the limitation, which had no present effect on them
and would affect them only if the unforeseeable contingency of a nuclear
accident occurred? Second, the case did not fall within established
requirements for federal question jurisdiction; within existing rules it could
be commenced only in state and not federal court. True, the point had not
been raised in the district court, but objections to subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be waived and must be considered whenever they arise.
The problem was that the structure of the suit was exactly that of the
famous Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley,75 in which Justice
Holmes held that a suit arises only under the law that creates the cause of
action and that a plaintiff cannot acquire federal jurisdiction by
anticipating a federal defense. Under the Mottley reasoning, the Duke
Power case arises under North Carolina tort law:76 the claim (when and
if the accident actually occurs) is that the company has tortiously deprived
the plaintiffs of their property in excess of the damages the company is
paying; the defense is that the Price-Anderson Act limits the company's
liability; the reply is that the Act is unconstitutional.
It would make perfect sense for federal jurisdiction to exist in cases
like Duke Power and Mottley that concern primarily the meaning of
federal law, and there are ways that the Court could have used Duke
Power to craft needed reforms in the law of federal jurisdiction.' 7
Instead, however, the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger,
imaginatively created an approach good for this case and this case alone.
First, the Chief Justice read the complaint to say that the plaintiffs were
asserting a cause of action arising directly under the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, although the complaint did not so state.78
Another serious difficulty with this theory was the absence of either a
government defendant or unconstitutional state action. Next, the Chief
Justice reminded us that even if no cause of action exists, a colorable
claim of a cause of action is sufficient to create federal question
jurisdiction, under the doctrine of Bell v. Hood.79 Therefore, said
Burger, it was not necessary to decide whether or not there actually was
75. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
76. The suit was for a declaratory judgment. It is settled that jurisdiction in declaratory
judgment actions depends upon the old form of action that would have been pursued before
a declaratory judgment action was available. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
339 U.S. 667 (1950).
77. See Martha A. Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 683, 693 (1981).
78. See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 69.
79. 327 U.S. 678 (1946); see also Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 70-71.
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a federal cause of action, because in any event the Court could decide the
issues as pendent to the (nonexistent) federal claim.'
Justice Rehnquist, in concurrence, forcefully refuted this reasoning
and demonstrated that exactly the same approach could have applied in
Mottley as well.8' Justice Stewart, also concurring, similarly
demonstrated that the Court's case or controversy holding did not square
with Supreme Court precedents.' But Chief Justice Burger, writing for
the majority, managed, by ignoring the precedents, to reach the merits of
the limitation of liability and held that it was constitutional.'
These applications of case or controversy doctrine and the rules of
federal question jurisdiction did not spell out new approaches that the
Court would continue to follow in the future. The purpose was simply to
avoid a politically inexpedient result in a particular case; if the Court had
allowed existing law to govern, it would never have reached the merits of
the case. Although the district court also would have been held to have
lacked jurisdiction, its opinion would have been left as the only one that
had reached the merits. It could have cast doubt on the validity of the
limitation of liability and thereby deterred nuclear power companies from
proceeding. It is these practicalities that guided the Supreme Court's
decision to put aside procedural concerns and reach the merits in this case.
Michigan v. Long" was another startling decision in which the
Court's ruling on important procedural matters seemed driven by the
Court's political agenda. The case came to the Supreme Court from the
Michigan Supreme Court and involved the scope of the adequate state
ground doctrine-the rule that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to
review a decision coming to it from a state court when the state court's
result rests independently and adequately upon state law. Even if the state
court relied upon federal as well as state law and expounded upon federal
law in its opinion, the adequate state ground rule does not permit the
Supreme Court to review such pronouncements unless altering the ruling
on federal law would change the result in the case. Justice Harlan was a
firm believer in the adequate state ground rule, even to the point of
considering it constitutionally required."
80. See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 71-72.
81. See id. at 95 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
82. See id. at 94 (Stewart, J., concurring).
83. See id. at 86-87.
84. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
85. See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Michigan v. Long involved the application of the Terry v. Ohio86

rule-that police could search for weapons without probable cause if they
had an "articulable suspicion" that a person was armed and dangerous-to

searches of the car the suspect was driving. The defendant had been
convicted of possession of marihuana based on such a search, but the

Michigan Supreme Court, citing both the Michigan and the United States
Constitutions, held the search impermissible.'

A classic application of

the adequate state ground ,rule in this situation would preclude U.S.
Supreme Court review; even if the Court reversed the ruling that the
federal Constitution prohibited the search, the result would not change
since it was also mandated by Michigan's constitutional law.
But the U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, did
not allow the state law ruling to interfere with the Court's jurisdiction to
set the record straight and to make clear that the search was
constitutionally permissible. Citing a need "to review an opinion that rests

primarily upon federal grounds " " in order to promote uniformity,
O'Connor created a presumption in favor of federal jurisdiction that
existed whenever both state and federal grounds were involved and the
state court had not made a "plain statement"' that its decision rested
upon an independent and adequate state ground.' O'Connor "openly
admit[ted]" 9z that the Court had not followed this approach in the

86. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
87. See People v. Long, 320 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Mich. 1982).
88. Long, 463 U.S. at 1040.
89. Id. at 1041.
90. A state court mindful of whether its decision is reviewable can still avoid Supreme
Court jurisdiction by making the prescribed plain statement. Adopting this approach, the
Long rule did not even alter what has always been the most disturbing aspect of the
adequate state ground rule-that state courts are given the power to choose whether their
opinions are reviewable, because if they do explicitly and independently rest upon state as
well as federal law, the United States Supreme Court cannot review the case.
If, on the other hand, the state court wants a Supreme Court pronouncement on the
particular question it is deciding, it is in the power of the state court to make that possible,
and indeed even to retain the option whether to follow a restrictive Supreme Court ruling
or on remand to rest the more far-reaching result squarely on state law grounds. A state
court can thus make the issue reviewable by deciding the case in the first instance on
federal grounds alone, not reaching the state law question. (Indeed, Long holds the same
result follows if the state court rested on both state and federal grounds without saying
clearly that the state ground was independent of the federal one).
It seems strange for state courts to have this power to manipulate Supreme Court
jurisdiction. Whatever purposes the adequate state ground rule is designed to serve, giving
state supreme courts the choice whether their federal decisions are reviewable is not among
them.
91. Long, 463 U.S. at 1038.
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past-sometimes presuming against the existence of federal jurisdiction
when the precise grounds were murky, sometimes asking the state court
whether the state ruling was independent of the federal one and sufficient
to sustain the result, and sometimes making its own judgment on that
question. But, said O'Connor, inconsistency was a bad policy and the new
approach she announced would be followed across the board.'
O'Connor's assertion that her approach of presuming in favor of
federal question jurisdiction would be followed consistently was utterly
unbelievable. Under such a presumption, a silent opinion from the highest
state court passing upon a matter in which state and federal issues were
raised would give rise to Supreme Court jurisdiction. Such a system
consistently followed would wreak havoc with the Supreme Court's
caseload. Of course, now that the Supreme Court docket is entirely
discretionary the Long approach is workable-it simply gives the Supreme
Court the opportunity, if it wishes, to review any case in which a federal
issue was raised and the state court has not taken care to declare explicitly
that its state law ruling is sufficient to control the result. But when
Michigan v. Long was decided, the Court still had a mandatory appellate
docket with respect to some of these cases from state courts, and the
Michigan v. Long rule followed generally would have placed cases within
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction that it could not possibly have
agreed to hear. Accordingly, the Court was willing to depart from
Michigan v. Long's approach whenever it seemed politic to do so.'
Today, it could follow Long consistently, but only because in 1988 the
Court's mandatory jurisdiction was abolished in favor of general certiorari
jurisdiction;' now Long simply gives the Court discretion to hear a wide
range of cases that it can escape, if it chooses, by denying cert.
Not only was the Michigan v. Long approach unworkable when it was
devised, it also was an extremely activist doctrine for a Court that was
concerned with federalism and states' rights to adopt. This reaching to
92. Id. at 1039.
93. See, e.g., Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Toole, 466 U.S. 378 (1984). Moreover,
after this paper was written, the Supreme Court in Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546
(1991), limited the Michigan v. Long presumption to cases that "fairly appear to rest
primarily on federal law or to be interwoven with federal law." Id. at 2557. In a
companion case, an exception to the plain statement rule was also created for unexplained
orders. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 111 S. Ct. 2590 (1991). Both these cases dealt with the
plain error, adequate state ground rule in terms of collateral relief on habeas, not of
Supreme Court review. Without such limitations, the Michigan v. Long approach would
still impose a large burden on federal courts on habeas, though it has not burdened Supreme
Court review since 1988, when appeals from state courts were discontinued. See infra note
94.
94. See Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 663 (1988).
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decide federal issues where state law appears controlling,95 this assertion
of a need for federal uniformity, are odd stances for Justice O'Connor'
and the Burger Court majority.'
Of course the Long holding was influenced by the fact that it led to
reinstating a criminal conviction. Moreover, it is a rule that allows the
Supreme Court to step in to put a lid on liberal constitutional
pronouncements by state courts. Indeed, the doctrine of increased Supreme
Court jurisdiction to review will only apply when state courts are alleged
to have overread constitutional rights and it is not sufficiently clear that
their holding rests on state law; when individuals have received less

protection than the Constitution requires, there never has been any
possibility of an adequate state ground, and it never
98 has mattered whether
the state decision rested on state or federal law.
A third case in which the Court used procedural doctrines in service
of its political agenda is the 1991 decision in Arizona v. Fulminante9 that
admission of coerced confessions can constitute harmless error." With

95. And indeed on remand, state law may prove controlling, so in retrospect, the
federal decision seems only advisory. In earlier cases the Court had occasionally decided
federal issues that might prove unnecessary upon remand to the state court. See, e.g.,
California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966);
Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481 (1942). In those cases, however, the Court
examined the opinion below and determined for itself, rightly or wrongly, that federal law
in fact had controlled the result. In Michigan v. Long, by contrast, the Court declined to
make any such determination but instead adopted a presumption, assertedly for all future
cases, that federal law was controlling in the absence of a clear statement to the contrary
from the state court.
96. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
97. Indeed, Justice Harlan's language from Mackey, quoted in text at note 31 supra,
is applicable here:
We apply and defiitively interpret the Constitution, under [the Court's] view of
our role, not because we are bound to, but only because we occasionally deem
it appropriate, useful, or wise. That sort of choice may permissibly be made by
a legislature or a council of revision, but not by a court of law.
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 677, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
98. For example, if a state court holds that a defendant's confession was not illegal
under state or federal law, and the defendant seeks Supreme Court review of the federal
ruling, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review, even if the state holding was equally
central to the decision, because a reversal on the federal question win require reversal of
the verdict. It is only when state law goes further than federal law in protecting individual
rights that the adequate state ground rule might apply-for example if the state court found
that use of the confession would violate both the state and federal Constitutions and the
error'claimed is that the U.S. Constitution does not go so far.
99. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
100. For a penetrating discussion of this decision, see Charles J. Ogletree, Arizona
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respect to this decision, there is direct evidence that Harlan would not
have agreed. As early as 1967, Justice Harlan had recognized "that
particular types of error have an effect which is so devastating or
inherently indeterminate that as a matter of law they cannot reasonably be
found harmless," citing the example of confessions."' 1
Decisions like these turn procedural doctrines and rules designed to
limit the judiciary into a bag of tricks that can be employed to accomplish
any desired substantive result. Ripeness and standing, rules of federal
question jurisdiction, adequate state ground, and harmless error are used
in new and creative ways when necessary to keep the prisoner in jail or
to encourage the building of nuclear power plants. " We do not
associate such use of procedural doctrines to agcomplish substantive results
with Justice Harlan, although Harlan might have favored the political
results furthered by all of those decisions. Moreover, in Long and Duke
Power the Court used procedural doctrine in a result-oriented fashion in
a way that expanded the Court's jurisdiction."1 The procedural doctrines
that Justice Harlan supported were much more likely to be doctrines of
restraint, cutting back on the Court's jurisdiction, rather than expanding
it.
Of course we cannot know for certain that if given the opportunity to
institute these more extreme results he would not have done so. Perhaps
Harlan would have jumped on the conservative bandwagon. 1°4 Perhaps
it is the luxury of the judge in the position of dissenter to retain his
intellectual purity because for the most part he doesn't have the
opportunity to effectuate the results he wants. I myself think of Justice
v. Fulminante: The Harm ofApplying Harmless Errorto Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 152 (1991).
101. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 52 n.7 (1967) (Harlan, J.,dissenting).
102. All such decisions are susceptible to the same characterization that Justice
Brennan made in Butler coneerning habeas: "Result, not reason, propels the Court today."
Butler v. MeKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1219 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Payne
v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2619 (1991) (Marshall, I., dissenting) ("Power, not reason,
is the new currency of this Court's decisionmaking.").
103. Fulminante also involved an expansion of court power-this time at the expense
of the jury.
104. Justice Felix Frankfurter had the reputation of being a principled judicial
conservative, but he was not above bending procedures and the principles he espoused in
order to put into place desired results. Moreover, he sometimes acted in a very activist
manner-for example in reaching for issues he did not have to decide--in order to impose
or create rules of restraint. See, e.g., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros.,
348 U.S. 511 (1955); Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); see
also Martha A. Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman
Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1077-78 & nn.22-23 (1974) (discussing
Frankfurter's opinion in Pullman).
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Harlan as principled enough to have resisted the opinions I have just
mentioned, but some who knew the man and not merely the man's
opinions might have a better basis for judging how he would have
operated had his context been changed.
In some ways a more interesting question than whether Harlan
actually was motivated by devotion to principles of judicial decision
making is whether that attitude is the best one for judges to adopt. Should
a judge care more about how he decides things than about what he--or
she--decides? Harlan's colleagues on the Supreme Court occasionally
expressed disbelief that he would fail to rule upon fundamental First
Amendment rights, for example, because of remote and abstract interests
of federalism. 5 Harlan persisted in favoring "procedural regularity"
even in cases in which it appeared that delay was a part of the state's
strategy in denying rights to its citizens.1 6 Even Justice Clark, himself
no crusader for civil rights, criticized Harlan in Baker v. Carrfor putting
abstractions above important rights: "It is well for this Court to practice
self-restraint and discipline in constitutional adjudication, but never in its
history have those principles received sanction where the national rights
of so many have been so clearly infringed for so long a time.""° It is
not clear to everyone that it is always appropriate to put procedural
concerns over the doing of substantive justice.
It may be that a Supreme Court consisting of nine Justice Harlans
would lack some important attributes. An appellate court functions best
with some diversity-not only diversity of race, religion, and gender but
also diversity of points of view, of passions, of experiences. Our model
Court, along with process-oriented judges like Justice Harlan, also would
include, for example, judges with social vision, jurists with-a passion for
105. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 221 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring)
("[C]onsidering the importance of the First Amendment rights at stake in this litigation, it
would require regard for some remote, theoretical interests of federalism to conclude that
this Court lacks jurisdiction ...."); see also United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar
Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967) ("[L]aws which actually affect the exercise of these vital
rights [to assemble peaceably and to petition for a redress of grievances] cannot be
sustained [as Justice Harlan would recommend] merely because they were enacted for the
purpose of dealing with some evil within the State's legislative competence .
.
106. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). There the Court overruled the
Georgia Supreme Court, which had held that a city could resign as trustee of a racially
restricted park without implicating the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court considered the
resignation a tactic to circumvent the integration of the park, but Justice Harlan would have
dismissed the case as improvidently granted, believing federal law insufficiently relevant
to the outcome to support Supreme Court jurisdiction. See id. at 315 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
107. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 262 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring).
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justice, or Justices who pay attention to and empathize with unrepresented
groups. Such judges are also of great importance to a great Court.
Although our model might not be a Court of nine Harlans, it also is
true that the Court he was on was much the richer for his presence. The
questions and objections he raised stimulated better work from his
colleagues as well as himself. There was much discussion at this
conference about whether Justice Harlan would have fully participated in
the Supreme Court's privacy revolution by joining the Court in Eisenstadt
v. Baird,"° ' where the year after Justice Harlan's retirement, the Court
extended the principle of privacy about decisions to use birth control from
married persons, where Griswold v. Connecticut" had established it,
to single persons as well. Would Harlan have joined the Court's holding?
Professor Yarbrough said at the conference that Harlan understood the
claims of homosexuals to privacy, an understanding that Yarbrough traced
to Harlan's days at Oxford."1 Could he have understood similar claims
on the part of single women, or would he have not gone so far?
Whatever his feelings about the outcome in Eisenstadt, Harlan almost
certainly would not have approved of the reasoning that the Court used to
reach the decision. Justice Brennan's opinion simply states that the holding
in Griswold applies to unmarried persons without laying out a logical basis
for that conclusion. 1 ' Even if Harlan agreed with the end result, he
surely would have been uncomfortable with this lack of reasoned
elaboration which he prized so highly.
I do not have a firm view about what position Harlan would ultimately
have taken in Eisenstadt, but I am convinced that he would have
recognized the importance of the issue before him in opening up the scope
of privacy doctrine, that he would have thought long and hard about it,
and that whether in concurrence or dissent, he would have caused the
Court not to settle for the ipse dixit that the Eisenstadt opinion was, but
to focus on the issue and its consequences and to discuss and decide it as
the important pronouncement it was. And Eisenstadt is but one example.
108. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
109. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
110. See Tinsley E. Yarbrough, Mr. Justice Harlan:Reflections of a Biographer, 36
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 223, 240 (1991). At least in his opinions, however, Justice Harlan
did not indicate much sympathy either for privacy concerns of homosexuals or for
unmarried persons who engaged in sex. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 552
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("I would not suggest that adultery, homosexuality,
fornication and incest are immune from criminal enquiry, however privately practiced.").
111. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. Bxnnan said: "If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
'whether to bear or beget a child." Id.
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In general, the Supreme Courts that followed Harlan would have
benefitted from greater attention to Harlan's example and his
contributions, which are relevant also to Justices with firmer substantive
agendas-conservative or liberal.
I myself disagreed with many of Justice Harlan's positions but had
enormous respect for him, both as a person and as a judge. He was the
model of legal process. He taught us all--or reminded us all-of reasoned
exposition, and of procedural regularity. Even those of us who were not
always convinced by the balance he struck between states' rights and the
demands of justice learned about federalism and separation of powers in
our disagreement. I am very proud to be able to participate in New York
Law School's centennial celebration honoring Justice 'John Marshall
Harlan.

